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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and W. 0.
BENTLEY, Chairman, and DR. GEORGE L.
REES, DR. HAROLD E. NELSON, PARLEY
T. RICHINS, RAY P. DYRENG, LYNN S.
RICHARDS, DR. WELLS T. BROCKBANK,
WILLIAM C. JENSEN, A. L. ELMER, members thereof, and E. ALLEN BATEMAN, executive officer thereof and Superintendent of
Plaintiffs,

Case No.
7785

_ -vs.COMMISSION OF FINANCE and P. H.
MULCAHY, TRUMAN S. CURTIS, and
MILTON B. TAYLOR, members thereof,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS
The 28th Legislature (Regular Session, 1949) adopted two Joint Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments (1) to Article X, Section 8, and (2) to Article VII,
5
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Sections 1, 10 and 20, Laws of Utah, 1949, pages 296· and
297. These proposed constitutional amendments were
voted upon, and adopted, by the people at the general
election in 1950.
Prior to its amendment Article. X, Section 8, of the
Utah Constitution provided:
The general control and supervision of the
Public School System shall be vested in a State
Board of Education, consisting of the Superintendent of Public Instruction; and such other persons as the Legislature may provide.
As amended said section now provides :
The general control and supervision of the
public school system shall be vested in a State
Board of Education the members of which shall be
elected as provided by law.
The Board shall appoint the State Superin-.
tendent of Public Instruction who shall be the ex·
ecutive officer of the Board.

By the amendments to Article VII the. Constitution
was changed (a) to delete the Superintendent of Public
Instruction from the list of elective officers constituting
the Executive Department as set out in Section 1 thereof, (b) to delete the office of Superintendent of Public
Instruction from the list of Executive Department offices named in Section 10 thereof where it is provided
that in the event of vacancy in such offices by death,
resignation or otherwise the Governor shall fill the same
by ap.pointment, and (c) to delete the office of Super6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intendent of Public Instruction fro1n those named in
Section 20 thereof, ·w·hich provides that officers of the
Executive Depart1nent, and other state and district offices provided for by la,v, shall receive for their services
monthly a compensation as fixed by law.
The Joint Resolution proposing the amendment to
~~rticle X did not specifically provide for an effective
date for that an1endment. The Joint Resolution proposing the runendn1ents to sections in Article VII, however,
provided that •'if adopted by the electors ·of the State,
this runendment shall take effect the first day of January,
1951."
In the Regular Session of the 29th Legislature
(1951) several bills were introduced to implement the
approved constitutional amendment to Article X, Section
8~ (H!B. No. 195, H.B~ No. 221 and H.B. No. 222; S.B_
No. 185, S.B. No 186, S.B. No. 221, and S.B. No. 222).
None of the bills, however, was passed. When the, Legislature met in Special Session in June, 1951, the GOivern.or
called attention to the failure to p·ass implementing legislation in the Regular Session and ·adde.d to the agenda
of the Special Session the matter of considerjng S'Uch
legislation. Three bills were introduced in ·the Special
.Session, H. B. No. 9 and S.B. Nos. 10 and 11. H~B. No.
9, as amended, was enacted and is now Chapter 16, Laws
of Utah, 1951, First Special Session. S.B. No. 10 was
· passed and is now Chapter 17, Laws of Utah, 1951, First
Special S.ession. S.B. No. 11 did not p·ass.
The Special Session of the Legislature adjourned

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

June 16, 1951. In accordance with Article VI, Section
25 of the Utah Constitution, the statutes passed during
the Special ·Session became e.ffective August 15, 1951.
Unde·r date of July 28, 1951 the Chairman of the State
Board of Education asked the Attorney General of Utah
for his opinion upon three questions : (1) Is it nece:Ssary
that an election for a member of the Board of Education
be held in Regional District No.7 in 1951 ~ (2) Does the
State Board of Education have authority to appoint a
State Superintendent of Public Instruction as soon as
the law becomes effective~ (3) Does the present State
Superintendent have the right to continue in office until
his elected term expires~ In an opinion dated September
6, 1951 the Attorney General answered (1) that in his
opinion no election should be held in 1951 in Regional
District 7, (2) that in his opinion the Board of Education
was then authorized to appoint the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, and (3) that the term to which the
Superintendent was elected in 1948 had been shortened
and that he was not entitled--as a matter of right to complete that term. At the meeting of the State Board of
Education held September 7, 1951, the following motion
was adopted:
Inasmuch as copies of the opinion requested
by the Chairman of the State Board of Education
from the Attorney General have not come to the
attention of membe.rs of the Bo·ard until today,
and inasmuch as all members of the Board are not
pr~sent at today's meetings~ the Board postpones
action on permanent ap·pomtment of the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction until the
members have had opportunity to study possible
8

•
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implications of the opinion and op·portunity for a
Ineeting to be held '"'ith a full membership· of the
Board present.
Pending final appointn1ent, the Board appoints E. Allen Bateman as State S·uperintendent
of Public Instruction and as Executive Officer of
the Board at the present salary ($6,000 per year.)
Such appointment is to be effective as of August
16, 1951, and Superintendent E~ Allen Bateman is
authorized to sign all documents and carry out all
business of the Board according to Board policy.
On October 5, 1951, the State Board of Education
appointed E. Allen Bateman State Superintendent of
Public Instruction and fixed his salary at $10,000 per
year. Exhibit "A" attached to Complaint. On October
9, 1951, the Board of Examiners, by a vote of two to
one, approved the request of the State Board of Education to pay the Superintendent a salary of $10,000 per
year. Exhibit "B," attache.d to Complaint.
Section 5, Chapter 123, Laws of Utah 1951, provides
that "Salaries of all state officers and employees shall
be paid semi-monthly." Salary claims were. submitted
for and on behalf of the Superintendent of Public In.:.
struction f-or the payroll p·eriods October 1 to 15, 1951,
and October 16 to 31, 1951, and said salary claims, each
in the amount of $416.66, were app·roved by the Board
of Examiners, by a vote of 2 to 1. Exhibits "C", "D",
"E" and "F", attached to Complaint. Defendants, however, refused, and despite the demand of Plaintiffs, still
refuse, to prepare and issue warrants to Superintendent
Bateman in payment of said salary claims. No salary

9
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has been paid to Superintendent Bateman since his appointment by the Board of Education on October 5, 1951.
Chapter 14, Laws of Utah 1943, (Section 87-5-3.10) provides that warrants shall be prepared, issued and drawn
by the Commission of Finance.
Except for the allegations in the Answer filed herein, defe~dants have not advised plaintiffs of the reason
or reasons why they have. refused, and still continue to
refuse, to prepare, draw and issue warrants for salary
claims of the Superintendent of Public Instruction.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION WAS AUTHORIZED TO APPOINT AND FIX THE SALARY OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

Effect of 1950 constitutional amendments.
That part of the amendment to Section 8, Article X
providing for the election of members of the State Board
of Education was not self-executing.
Ef!ect of the implementing legislation.
Superintendent Bateman's term was shortened, but
t~e office was not abolished and no vacancy was created.
The offices of members of the Board were not abolished and no vacancies were created.
_ Under the amendments and statutes the Board of
Edu_cation ~as authorized to appoint and fix the salary
of the Supenntendent.
·
10
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POINT II.
THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
TO FIX THE SUPERINTENDENT'S SALARY WAS SUBJECT ONLY TO APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.

Salary of Superintendent no longer had to be "fixed

by la,v."

Not being a salary fixed by law, approval by the
Board of Exruniners was necessary.
The salary claims having be.en approved by the
Board of Examiners the Commission of Finance could
not refuse to issue warrants if funds weTe available.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION WAS AUTHORIZED TO APPOINT AND FIX THE SALARY OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

Effect of 1950 constitutional amendments.
Prior to its amendment in 1950 Article X, Section
8 of the Utah Constitution provided that the State Board
of Education consisted of the "Superintendent of Public
Instruction and such other persons as the. Legislature
may provide." By Section 75-7-1, UCA 1943, the Legislature had provided that the Board "shall consist of the
state superintendent of public instruction and nine· other
persons, appointed by seven regional school board conventions."
The 1950 amendment changed Article X, Section 8
to read:
11
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of the
The general control and supe rvision
.
public school system shall be vested ln. a State
Board of Education the members of which shall
be ele~cted as provided by law.
The Board shall appoint the State Superintendent of Public Instruction who shall be the executive officer of the Board.

By Chapter 16, ·Laws of Utah 1951, First Special Session,
the Legislature established the machinery for the election of members of the Board, continued the terms of
present members of the Board until elections are held in
1952, 1954 and 1956 and their successors are elected and
qualified, and also provided that the Board "shall fix
the salary of the state superintendent of public instruction, who shall be the executive officer of the board."
Article VII, Sections 1, 10 and 20, prior to their
amendment in 1950, provided:
The Executive Department shall consist of
Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor,
State Treasurer, Attorney Gene·ral, and Superintendent of Public Instruction, each of who~
shall hold his office for four years, beginning on
the first Monday of January next after his ~lec
tion. * * • (Sec. 1)

* * If the office of secretary of the state,
state. auditor, state treasurer, attorney gene·ral,
or superintendent of public instruction be vacated
by death, resignation or otherwise, it shall be the
duty of the. governor to fill the same by appointment, and the appointee shall hold his office until
his successor shall be elected and qualified as may
be b~ law provided. (Sec. 10)
'
*

12
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The GoYernor, Serretary of State,, Auditor,
Treasurer, _1-\.ttorney GeneTal, Superintendent of
Public Instruction and surh other State- and distriet officers as 1nay be provided fo~ by law, shall
receive for their services monthly, a compensation
as fixed by la,Y. * * * (See. 20)
The 1950 a1nendments deleted the Superintendent of
Public Instruction from each of the three Sections of
Article \"'"II.
The 1950 runendments did not change Section 19 of
Article \"'II which provides :
The Superintendent of Public Instruction
shall perform such duties as may be pro;vided by
law.
Neither did the 1950 amendments delete the reference to
the office of Superintendent of Public Instruction in Section 15 of the same Article, which deals with the Board
of Reform School Commissioners.
The effect of the amendment to Article X, Section
8 of the Constitution was to:
1. Provide that the State Board of Education shall be "elected as provided by law," whe,reas in the past the members have been appointed
by regional school board conventions.
2. Eliminate the Superintendent from membership on the Board.
3. Authorize the Board to appoint the Superintendent, "who shall be the executive officer
of the Board."
The effect of the an1endment to Article VII, Sections
1, 10 and 20 was to :

13
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1. Eliminate the Superinte·ndent from ~he
.
.
t• g the Executive
list of elected officers
cons t"t
1 u In
.
Department. That Department now consist~ of
the Governor Secretary of State, State Auditor,
State Treasu;er and Attorney General.
2. Take the Superintendent out fr_om the
provisions of Section 2 of Article VII, which provide·s that the officers named in Section 1 shall
be elected, etc.
3. Take the Superintendent out from the
provisions of Section 3 of Article VII, which,
among other things, provides that no person shall
be eligible to any office listed in Section 1 unless
he (a) is a qualified elector, and (b) shall have
been a resident citizen of the. State for five years
next preceding his election.
4. Take the office of Superintendent out of
the list of offices set out in Section 10 to which, in
the event of vacancies, the Governor may make
appointments.
5. Take the Superintendent out of the. list of
Executive Department office-rs and other state
and district officers who, by virtue of Section
20, "shall receive for their service:S monthly, a
comp_ensation as fixed by law," etc.

That part of the amendment to Section 8, Article X,
providing for the election of members of the State Board
of Education was not· self-executing.
In determining whether a constitutional amendment
is self-executing. the question is whether the "constitutional provision is addressed to the courts or to the
legislature.'' Wbe·re, as in the case before the Court,
the le-gislature is directed to make suitable provisions
14
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for carrying the runendment into effect that amendInent is Hobviously addressed to the legislature and is
indicative of the intention that such amendment should
not become effective until made so by an act of the lHgislature." 11. ~-lm. Jur. p. 690, Sec. 73. A constitutional
provision is self-executing only if there is nothing to be
done by the legislature to put it into operation, if the
rights conferred and liabilities imposed are fixed by
the Constitution itself, "and there is no language· indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action. 11 Am. Jur. p. 692. Provisions relating to elections are not self-executing which "by express terms or
by implication show the necessity for action by the legislature in order that they may become effective." 16 C.J.S.
p. 109 Sec. 53. See In Re Montello Salt Co., 88 U. 283,
53 P. 2d 727, 729, and Anderson v. Cook, 102 P. 265, 130
P. 2d 278 ; State ex rei Richardson v. Ewing, 17 Mo. 515 ;
State ex rel Hudd v. Timme Secretary of State (Wis.,
1882) 11 N.W. 785; Opinion of Justices 3 Gray (Mass.)
601; State v. Scott, 9 Ark. 270.
We think there can be no doubt that the provision
in qn~stion was not self-executing. It specifically states
that the mHmbers of the Board of Education shall be
elected "as provided by law." Clearly this provision was
directed to the LHgislature, and implementing legislation
was necessary to carry it out.
Effect of the implementing legislation.
As previously noted, several bills were introduced
in the Regular Session of the 1951 Legislature to imple-

15
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ment the constitutional amendme·nts adopted in 1950.
These bills failed of passage, howeve~r, and the subject
was added to the agenda of the Special Se,ssion which
convened in June 1951. See letter of the Gove~rnor to
the House dated June 6, 1951, .House Journal, 29th Legislature, First Special Ses.sion, p. 24, and Senate Journal,
p. 32. Two statutes which were enacted at that Special
Session are now designated Chapters 16 and 17, Laws of
Utah 1951, First Special Session.
Chapter 16 amended Section 75-7-1, UCA 1943, to
provide that the "state board of education shall consist
of nine pe.rsons elected by qualified registe·red electors
according to election districts, as hereinafter provided."
It set up election districts on the same geographical
basis as judicial districts, established a nominating procedure and then provided that the "elections shall be
conducted as a part of the general election with the same
judges of election, the same constables, and the same polling places, bu~ with separate ballots." After stipulating
that the returns shall be canvassed by district boards of
education and the State Board of Education, Chapter
16 (in Sec. 75-7-1.50) p·rovided (1) that in the November,
1952 general election, and e:very six years thereafter,
three members shall be elected from Regional District
No. 3, (2) that in the November, 1954 gene~ral election,
and every six . years thereafter, one member shall be
elected in each of Regional Districts Nos. 4, 6 and 1, and
(3) that in the N ovembe~r, 1956 gene:ral election, and
every six years thereafteT, one member shall be elected
16
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in each of Regional Districts Nos. 5, 2 and 7. This. ne:w
section then provided:
Each member of the state board. of education
shall be elected for a ter1n of six years and until
his successor is elected and qualified. ·
The terms of office of the present members
of the state board of education are continued until their successors are elected and qualify.
Chapter 16 also runended Section 75-7-2 to in p·art
provide:
The state board of education shall elect from
its members a chairman and vice-chairman. Such
officers shall be elected or appointed at the first
meeting of the board in F·ebruary, 1952, and each
year thereafter. The duties of these officers shall
be determined by the board. The, board shall also
appoint a secretary of the board who shall se~rve
at the pleasure of the board.
The state board of education shall appoint
and shall fix the salary of the state superi:~lten
dent of"public instruction, who shall be· the executive officer of the board.
After making provision for the appointment of
assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors, assistants, clerical workers and other employees., and f~:r
the fixing of their salaries by the Board, the statute
also provides for an allowance of $300.00 per year for
members of the Board and for the payment of traveling
expenses. It concludes with this provision:
All existing statutes of the state of Utah which
are inconsistent or in conflict with this act, are to
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the extent of such inconsistency or conflict, declared null and void insofar as they relate to the
provisions of this act.
The provisions of Chapter 16 are consistent with
the amendments adopted by the people in 1950, and with
other pro:visions: of , the Constitution of this State. By
enacting what is now Chapter 17, Laws of Utah 1951,
First Special Session, the legislature specified what
qualifications the Superintendent of Public Instruction
must have and made it clear that he should "se!rve at the
pleasure of the Board." The two statutes appropriately
implemented the constitutional amendments and completed the· changes in the State Board of Education and
in the· office of Superintendent of Public Instruction endorsed by the people of this state when they adopted
the amendments in 1950.
It will be noted that the first sentence· of Section
75-7-1.50 reads as foJlows:
There shall be elected on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday of November in 1951, one
me·mber of the state board of education from
Regional District No. 7.
We submit that it was a case· of pure· inadvertence to
leave this sente;nce· in the Section, and that the wording
of the sentence is so meaningless and so inconsistent
with the obvious intention of the Le·gislature that it
should be rejected as surplusage and omitted, eliminated
and disregarded.
Chapter 16 was H.B. No. 9 in the Special Session.
18
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As introduced H.B. No.9 provided that on the first Wednesday in Dece1nber, 1951, one 1nen1ber of the state board
of education should be elected fro1n each of Regional
Districts Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and that in 1952 three
members should be elected from Regional District No.
3. The Journal of the proceedings in the. House1 shOiws
that the House runended this section to provide for the
election of one member from Regional District No. 7 in
November, 1951, the election of three members from Dis--·
trict No. 3 in D·ecen1ber, 1952·, and for the election of the.
other five members, one each year, in the following
order : Region No. 4 in 1953, Region No. 6 in 1954, Re~
gion No. 1 in 1955, Region No. 5 in 1956, and Region No~.
2 in 1957. (House Journal 29th Legislature, First Sp·ecial
Session, pp. 103-104)
When H.B. No. 9 was before the S·enate it was
amended so that Section 75-7-1.50 provided for the election of three members from· District No. 3 in November
1952, one member from each of Districts Nos. 4, 6 and
1 in 1954, and one member from each of Districts Nos.
5, 2 and .7 in 1956. The Senate also amended the bill
to provide that the elections should be conducted as part
of the general elections, with the same .judges, constables,
and _polling places, but with separate ballots. (Senate
Journal 29th Legislature, First S.pecial Session, pp. 126127) It was purely an oversight not to strike out the first
sentence of the Section, quoted above.. That sentence is
wholly inconsistent with the provision that elections of
members of the State Board of Education should be conducted as part of the general elections. Not only was
19
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there no general election in 1951, but no machinery whatsoever was set up to conduct any district-wide election
in District No. 7; or any other district in the state in that·
year. Furthe1rmore, the bill as passed prOivided (in Sec.
75-7-1.20) for nominations to be made by district conventions in the month ·of March in 1952, 1954 and 1956,
and each six years thereafter. No provision was made
for any nominating convention in 1951-in fact Chapter
i6, which was passed on June 16, 1951, did not become
effective until August 15, 1951. While the. alternate
me;thod of bein~ nominated- by filing a petition with
the Secretary of State on or before the last Wednesday
of September - was still open, the conclusion is inescapable that the Legislature did not intend that an election should be held in 1951. If it had so intended it would
have provided the necessary machinery for holding a district-wide election and most likely would have provided
a special nominating procedure.
The election of one member in 1951 is inconsistent
with -the provisions in Sectioo 75-7-1 as amended by
Chapter 16, and in Section 75-7-1.50 that each member
should be elected for a tenn of six years. It will be remembered that Section 75-7-1.50 provided that in 1956
-which would be only five years after 1951-one member should be e~lected from Regional District No. 7. We
submit that the sentence in question comes within the
rule that where "words of a statute are so meaningless
or inconsistent with the intention of the legislature otherwise plainly expressed in the statute, * * * they may be
rejected as surplusage, and omitted, eliminated, or dis20
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regarded." 50 An1. J ur., Statutes, Sec. 231, p. 219. See
Leibson v. Henry, 356 nlo. ~)53, :204 S.W. 2d 310; State v.
Bates, 961\Iinn. 110, 104 N.,:v. 709.

Superintendent Bateman's term was shortened, but the
office was not abolished and no vacancy was created.
The proposal to amend Sections 1, 10 and 20 of
Article ' 7 II concluded \vith this language:
If adopted by the electors of the~ State, this
amendment shall take effect the first day of J anuary, 1951.
The amendments to Sections 1, 10 and 20, clearly weTe
self-executing. There was nothing in them that was directed to the Legislature. Likewise, that part of the
amendment to Section 8 of Article X which provided that
the Superintendent should be appointed by the State
Board of Education was self-executing and needed no
legislation to be carried into effect. Together, these
amendatory provisions changed the constitutional office
of Superintendent of Public Instruction from one elected
by the people, to one which thereafter should be filled hy
appointment by the State Board of Education. They also
removed the Superintendent from the list of officers
whose compensation must be "fixed by law," and remov~ the office fro~ th~ list of those which, in the e;v:ent
of vacancies, can he filled by gubernatorial ap.pointment.
This Court in the case of Snow v. Keddington, 11.3
U. 325, 195 P. 2d 234, held that while the. general rule
is that "a constitutional amendment becomes effective
on the date it is passed by a majority vote of the people"
21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

this rule is "not applicable- if the amendme-nt that is submitted to the voters include:S a pro¥ision that the same
shall take effe.ct on a later designated date." Under the
authority of that case it would appear that the effective
date of the amendments to Sections 1, 10 and 20 of Article. VII was January 1, 1951, and that that part of the
amendment to Section 8 of Article X which pro:vides
that the State Board of Education shall appoint the Superintendent of Public Instruction became effective when
appro~ed by the voters.
In the Snow case this Court also recognized the principle that puplic offices may be ''created, abolished, or
the time shortened or lengthened by constitutional
amendment.''
I

In the leading case of Luckett v. Madison County,
137 Miss. 1, 101 So. 851, 37 ALR 814, the Court said:
Certainly the people of the state by constitutional provision may abolish any office at any
time. The Constitution is supreme, and voices the
command of the sovereign people. The office
holder has no vested right therein, nor does he
hold the office· by contract.
S.ee also Martello v. ~uperior Court, etc. 202 Cal. 400,
261 P. 476; Deupree v. Payne, 197 Cal. 529, 241 P. 669;
State v. Duncan, 108 Mont. 141, 88 P. 2d 73; State v.
Cooney, 70 Mont. 355, 22·5 P. 1007; 42 Am. Jur. pp. 904906; 4 ALR 210, and 172 ALR 1375.
The effect of the amendments to Se·ction 8 of Article
X and Sections 1, 10 and 20 of Article VII was to shorten
22
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Dr. Baten1an's ter1n, to 'vhich he was electe~d in 1948, to
January 1, 1951, or earlier. It 1nay be concluded that
that part of the nn1endn1ent of Section 8 of Article X,
providing that the Superintendent should be appointed
by the Board, alone shortened the term to which Dr.
Bateman '""as elected. ('iertainly, that amendatory provision plus the amendn1ents to Sections 1, 10 and ·20 of
Article, '~II acco1nplished a shortening of the term. The
Board of Education could have made an effective appointment on whatever date the term was shortened. ·
When the amendments are considered in the light
of the circumstances under which they we,re proposed
and adopted, the intent of the legislature and of the
people in approving them, it is clear that they did not
abolish the office of Superintendent, nor _did th_ey create
any vac~cy in that office. The purpose of the two amendments adopted in 1950 was to take the S-upe:rintendent _"out of politics" by changing the office from one that
was elective to one that was appoin-tive, and to give the
power of appointment to the Board of Education. Neither
by specific provision, nor by implication, do the am~nd
ments indicate any intention to abolish the constitutional
office of Superintendent. While the. Superintende·nt is
no longer one of the elective officers making up the Executive Department, as defined in Seetion 1 of Article
VII, and the duties of the office are some~what changed,
nevertheless the status and duties of the Superintendent
are still defined g~nerally by constitutional provisions.
Section 8 of Article X, as amended, prOivides that the
Superintendent shall be appointed by the Board, and
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that he shall be the executive officer of the. Board, and
Section 19 of Articie VII still provides that the Superintendent "shall p·erform such duties as may be pro;vi.ded
by law."
Clearly, the Superintendent is still a constitutional
officer. The constitutional status, functions and duties
of the office are not subject to change or termination
by the Legislature.. ~hat body may not deprive the
Superintendent of his status as the e;xecutive office-r of
the Board, nor take from him the powers and duties
which the people conferred upon him when they made
him the executive officer of the Board. Likewise, the
Legislature may not provide for a different method or
procedure for selecting the Superintendent than that set
out in the constitutional amendment. Under Section 19
of Article VII the Legislature may provide additional
duties to be performed by the Superintendent consistent
with his status as an appointee and executive officer of
the Board and consistent with his constitutional duties
as such, but the people alone have the power to alte:r or
take away his constitutional status, powers and duties.
At the time Dr. Bateman was elected to the office
of Superintendent in 1948 both the Constitution and Sec~
tion 75-8-1, UCA 1943, provided that his term should be
for four years. Section 75-8-1 added the words "and until his successor is _'elected and qualified." If the constitutional amendments which shortened his term also by
implication repealed the provisions of Section 75-8-1, then
at least on ,January 1, 1951, there was no sp.eci:fic statu24
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tory or constitutional proYision authorizing the Superintendent to hold o:ver until his successor was either elected
or appointed and qualified.
e think it is clear, under
the authority of the holding of this Court in Pete,rson
v. Benson~ 38 U. 286, 112 P. 801, that Dr. Bateman was
at least a de facto officer until the time of his appointInent by the Board, at 'vhich time he became a de jure
officer.

'T

The fact situation before the Court in the Pete·rson
case briefly was as follows: the town marshal in Logan
was elected for a two year term at the election in November 1907; in 1909 the Legislature amended the law. to
provide that the marshal should be appointed by the
mayor; this amended law was in effect when the marshal's two year term expired on January 3, 1910, but no
appointment was made, and the action was brought to
recover his salary for the month of February, 1910;
while the law under which the marshal was elected p·rovided that his term was for two years and until his successor was elected and qualified, there was, of coursH, no
such provision in the new law which authorized the ap·pointment of the marshal. The Court held that the marshal was not holding over, but was a de facto officer and
was entitled to the compensation of the office. - In so
ruling the court said :
As appellant was not appointed to the office
after his term expired, and the law under which he
had been elected having been, in effect, repealed,
it follows that during the month. of February,
1910, he was not a de jure officer, and was in no
25
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sense a holdover as the term 'holdover' is understood when appiied to a person holding a public
office. State v. Simon, 20 Or. 365, 26 Pac. 170.
It does appear, however, that he was a de facto
officer' and as such discharged all the: duties
of the office during the month of February,
1910. The important question therefore is,
can an actual incumbent of a public office,
who is only an officer de facto and in no sense a
de jure officer, maintain an action for the salary,
fees, or other compensation attached to the office,
there being no adverse claimant, or de jure officer' * * • In cases, however, where there is no
de jure officer, the line of-decisions last mentioned
hold that a de facto officer who, in good faith,
has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining the,reto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office and may,
in an appropriate action, recover the salary, fees,
and other compensation attached to the office.
.

See also Fowler et al. v. Gillman, et al., 76 U. 414,
290 P. 358.
In Section 141 of 67 C.J.S. Officers, page 444, appears the following statement.
One who holds over after the expiration of his
legal term,· where no provision is made by law for
his holding over, is gener~lly regarded as a de
facto officer, but on the office being filled either
by appointment or election, as may be provided by
statute for the filling of the office, and the qualification of the appointee or electee, the de facto
status terminates.
In Section 135 of the same volume, at page 440, is the
following:

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Office holding de facto is a fiction of law
designed to serve a useful purpose, but t:P,e. fiction
does not abolish the la.,v. While a de facto officer
has been held not to be an· officer, although his
acts may have legal effect, he has also been held
to be a legal officer until ousted, and to be submitted to as such until displaced by a regular
direct proceeding for that purpose.
-.A~

,.

From the time his elective term was shortened by
adoption of the 1950 amendments until he was appointed
Superintendent by the Board of Education, Dr. Bateman
was at least the de facto Superintendent of Public Instruction. His acts were legal and he was entitled to the
emoluments of the office. The office had not been abolished and there was no vacancy which could be filled by
the Governor under Section 9 of Article VII of the Utah
Constitution. Dr. Bateman was eligible for appointment
to the office by the Board, and he was properly appointed.
The offices of members of tb,e Board were not abolished
and no vacancies were created.

The amendment to Section 8 of Article X did not
abolish the State Board of Education. It changed the
membership of the Board by taking the Superintendent
()ff, changed the method of sel~ting membe·rs of the
Board by providing that they "shall be elected as provided by law,"' and gave the Board the additional constitutional power to appoint the Superintendent of Public
Instruction. No change was made in its fundamental
constitutional . powers and duties to exe:rcise "general
control and supervision of the public school system."
27
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Just as in the case of the Superintendent,. there is
nothing in this amendment which either specifically, or
by implication, indicates any intention to abolish the
offices or to affect their status as constitutional offices.
The ve·ry fact that the Legislature in Sec. 75-7-1.50 provided that the "terms of office of the present members
of the state board of education are continued until their
successors are elected and qualify" shows that that body
did not consider the offices aboJished. That part of the
amendment to Sec. 8 of Article X which changed the
met~od of selecting members of the Board was not selfexecuting and was directed to the Legislature for action.
'rhe Legislature in carrying out the constitutional mandate properly acted to continue· the terms of the incumbents so as to prevent any hiatus or interruption in the
administration of the educational system of the State.
In carrying into effect the non-self-executing constitutional provision the Legislature legally could have
shortened the terms of all members of the Board and
provided for immediate elections. The Legislature, however, decided that the entire membership of the Board
should not be elected in the same election. Consquently,
the election machinery approved provides for the election of three members in 1952, three in 1954 and three
in 1956. Actually, the provision in the statute continuing the terms until their successors are elected and qualified lengthens the terms of some membe:rs and shortens
the terms of others.
In Snow v. Keddington, supra, this Court recognized
the powe-r of the Legislature to harmonize and produce
28
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unifonnity in terms of office. The principle was stated
in this language :
The legislature has the power to secure uniformity in official terms and to harmonize the
terms of office of county officers. The fact that
by changing the co1nmencement date of a term,
one officer obtains an additional period in which
to serve does not render the plan illegal. If the act
is fairly intended to co~ordinate and unify the
various county offices into an operating political
body with continuity, and is not intended solely
to grant incumbent officers an extra term, then it
cannot be rejected because it may extend a term
of one office.
See also State ex rel Jordan v. Bailey (Minn. 1887)
33 N.W. 778. The Legislature was well within its power
when it directed that three members of the Board be
elected in 1952, three in 1954 and three in 1956, and that
the terms of the incumbent members of the Board should
be continued until their successors were elected and
qualified. This action conformed to the mandate of the
people as set out in the amendment calling upon the legis-lature to provide when and in what manner members
of the_ Board should be elected and how many members
should constitute the Board.
An interesting case involving a somewhat similar
situation is State ex rei Richardson v. Ewing, 17 Mo. 515
(1853). There the constitutional amendment abolished
the section of the constitution providing for the appoin.tInent of the Secretary of State and then pro¥ide·d that
that officer "shall be elected by the qualified voters of
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this state at such time and in such manner as shall be
' law." Ewing had been appointed to the office
provided by
for a four year term in 1849. The amendment was
adopted in 1851 and Richardson was elected to the office
in 1852. In holding that the amendment did not abolish
the office and did not create any vacancy the court said:
The first impression made by reading this
amendment is, that the office created by the original constitution is abolished by abolishing the
clause under which it existed; but an attentive
examination of the whole amendment will satisfy
the mind, that such is not its effect. * * * The
whole amendment being ratified, the two clauses
went into force together, and the second clause
took its place in the constitution as the provision
under which the office of secretary of state was to
continue. Under it, the duty was imposed upon
the general assembly to provide for the election
of a secretary by the voters of the state ; and when
such provision was made and a person was duly
elected to the office, then there would be a secretary of state elected, as the constitution required.
In the mean time, before such election, the office
existed, and the present incumbent was not disturbed in his right to it by the terms of the amendment. The office under the amendment, is the
same office that existed before. As the. amendment contemplated legislation for the purpose. of
electing a person to hold the office, and as the
time at which such election should be held was
left entirely to the discretion of the legislature,
it would be a forced construction of the amendment to make it continue the office in being, and
still render it vacant. It may be· admitted that,
after the amendment was adopted the clause in
the original constitution ceased to h~ve any opera30
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tion, and had no effect either upon the office. or
the rights of the officer. Still the amendment is
to be regarded as having been adopted with refe-rence to the actual condition of things existing at
its adoption. The office. then existed, and it was
enjoyed by an officer regularly appointed. The
amendment continued the ex~stence of the office,
and proposed that, at a future time, it should be
filled by the election of an officer. It is but a
reasonable interpretation of the amendment to
say that, by implication fro1n its own terms, it
continued the incumbent in office. until a secretary
should be elected under the amendment. It speaks
in the future; 'there shall be a secretary of state,
who shall be elected.' Until such secretary fs
elected, it is implied that the officer in p-ossession
of the office shall continue to possess it. * * *
In that case the Missouri legislature by an act passed
in 1851 had provided that "the incumbents of any of the
offices aforesaid shall hold their office until their successors shall be elected and qualified." That language
is similar to the provision in the statute passed by the
Special Session that the "terms of office of the present
members of the state board of education are continued
until their successors are elected and qualify." The Missouri court held that even if the constitutional amendment were construed as leaving the pe.rson then in the
office "without any right to it, under the· constitution, it
is clear that no provision was made for any other p.erson
to hold it, until a per~on should be elected under a law
to be enacted by the general assembly." Under the circumstances, the court said, the incumbent was entitled
to hold over under the statutory pro:vision.
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The court held that when an election was held under
the impleme!nting statute such elected official was entitled to the office-, and concluded with this language·:
This construction gives to Mr. Richardson the
right to the office from tl).e time of his election,
prevents any interregnum, preserves the government from confusion that would otherwise be introduced into its affairs, and gives effect to the
intention of the people and the general assembly.
In the Ewing case the argument that the constitutional amendment abolished the appointive office was
materially strengthened by the provision which specifically abolished the section of the constitution which authorized such appointment. In the case before this court
the amendment to Section 8 of Article X simply changed
the members of the board from appointive to elective
officers. It would be a forced interpretation of the· amendment, and certainly would be contrary to the intent of the
people, to conclude that the offices of members on the
Board were abolished or that vacancies were created
in such offices.
In the case of State ex rei Hudd v. Timme, Secretary
of State, (Wis. 1882), 11 N.W. 785 the Court had before
it a constitutional amendment providing that the legislature should meet biennially instead of annually, and
increasing le.gislators' salaries. The Court held that
the amendment did not go in effect immediately so as
to be applicable- to members of the legislature elected
in the same election at which the amendment was ap32
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proved, and that it could not go into effect until the legislature had fixed the tiine for sessions of the biennial
legislature and an election had been held. In so ruling
the court said:
It is our duty to examine and construe the
amendment as it has been adopted by the legislature and the people, and give it effect if we can,
without interrupting the harmonious action of the
government, until such time as its pro:visions can
be carried into effect by proper action unde~r it.
In giving construction to these provisions we
must look at the existing state of things at the
time of their adoption, and they must be conside~r
ed in connection with the proposed change;. * * *
It would be absurd to hold that there was any
intention, either on the part of the legislature or
the people, to interrupt the regular course of
government of the state· by the adoption of these
amendments.***
These pro:visions contemplate. that there
would be a constitutional law-making body in the
state after the adoption of the amendment and
before any legislature could be elected or convene
under it. There can be, we think, no doubt. but
that the legislature in passing it, and the p·eople
in ratifying, the amendment conte-mplated and intended that the old system of things should remain in full force until an election could take place
under the new. Any other construction of the
amendment would be in plain contradiction of its
terms, and would render it impossible to p·ut its
provisions into practical effect. To hold that these
amendments took effect immediately on their adop·tion, so as to absoJutely aboJish the present p·rovisions of the constitution for all purposes, would
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compel us to hold that the present le-gislature was
not a constitutional body, and that all its proceedings we·re absolutely void. We think no such construction is required from the language used in
the amendment; and it is very clear that such was
not the intention either of the legislature or the
people-.
The- Wisconsin court relied upon Opinion of Justices,
3 Gray (Mass.) 601 and State v. Sc~·tt, 9 Ark. ?70. In
the Massachusetts opinion the Justices of the Supreme
Court of that State answered questions propounded by
the Governor of that state as to the effect of a constitutional amendment p·roviding for the election of members of the executive council. Prior to the amendment
members of. the council were appointed by the Legislature. The Justices he-ld that the amendment could not
be "practicaliy carried into effect, and there can be no
election of councillors by the people,_ until the legislature
shall have divided the Commonwealth into eight districts," as required by'the amendment.
The constitutional amendment involved in the case
of State· v. Sc:ott, supra, related to the method of selecting
circuit judges. Prior to the amendment they were appointed, but the amendment provided: "The qualified
v9ters of each judicial circuit in this state shall elect
their circuit judge." As to the effect of this amendment
the court said :
If the oamendment so operated as to occasion
a vacancy immediately upon its adoption, there
being no express declaration to that effect, it can
result alone from the fact that, in the transfer
of the power of filling the office to the people
34
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of the several circuits, the entire foundation upon
which the inrtunbent stood was overturned and
utterly destroyed. Ho'v 'vould such a construction
comport with the obvious sense of the. terms use.d
and the manifest intention of the fran1ers of the
instrun1ent; or, in other words, would it be a fair
and liberal interpretation and such an one as
would be calculated to promote the true objects
of the grant~ If the amendment will bear such a
construction as to allow other provisions of the
constitution to stand without doing violence to
any, it is then clearly permissible to put such a
construction upon it. If the intention -was to cre·ate vacancies, is it not fair and re·asonable. to s-uppose that words would have been employed directly and emphatically declarative of that purpose,
and that no room would have been left for doubt
or construction~ I apprehend that such would
have been the case. * * * -The mere amendment
itself cannot be said, in any possible view of the
case, to produce a vecancy in the office; for all
that could be claimed under it would be. a mere
naked power to be called into life and ·action when
it should please- the legislature· to pass a law fixing the time and prescribing the manner of p·utting it into operation. This is the strongest view
that could be taken against the defendant, and
this most clearly shows that it could not go into
immediate operation. The distinction then that
lies at the bottom of the whole matter is, that the
amendment was not designed to act either upon
the office or the incumbent during his constitutional term, but that the only end and object of
it was to change the mode of exe~rcising the power
of filling the offices. It is argued that, inasmuch
as the _power to elect the circuit judges has been
taken away from the Legislature, and transfe~rred
to the qualified voters of the several circuits,
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there.fore the people have resumed one. of the sovereign powers of the government, and that by the
. mere act of resumption, or withdrawal, of the
power,· the office that had p-reviously been filled
by its exercise, was immediately vacated. To the
correctness of this proposition, I cannot yield by
assent. The power to fill the office· of circuit
judge is equally sovereign whether exercised by
the people's representatives, or by the. people
themselves, and as a matter of course, the rights
that attach themselves to the officer upon the election, in either mode, must be ide·ntically the same.

Under the amendments and statutes the Board of Education was authorized to appoint and fix the salary of the
Superintendent.
Those parts of the constitutional amendments which
deleted the office of S.uperintendent of Public Instruction
from Se:ctions 1, 10 and 20 of Article VII, and which
authorized the Board of Education to appoint the Superintendent, were self-executing. They had the effect of
shortening the tenn to which Dr. Bateman was elected
in 1948,. and authorized the State Board of Education
to appoint the Superintendent. The amendments neither
abolished the office of Superintendent, nor did they create any vacancy in the· office.
As we view the matter, the amendment to Section
8 of Article X authorizing the Board of Education to
make an ap·pointment to the office of Superintendent
became e.ffective upon adoption by the people, and the
amendment of Sections 1, 10 and 20 of Article VII took
effect on January 1, 1951. The amendment of Sections
1,. 10 and 20 and Section _8 of Article X shortened the
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term to "rhich the Superintendent was elected in 1948
to January 1, 1951, after which date Dr. Bateman held
the office at least as a de facto officer until the time: of
his appointment by the Board of Education.
The statute passed by the Special Session not only
specifically authorized the Board of Education to appoint
the Superintendent of Public Instruction but also empowered that Board t9 fix his salary. Prope~r action was
taken by a de jure Board of Education appointing D·r.
Bateman and fixing his salary. The action setting the
salary at $10,000 was approved by the· Board of Examiners. Everything that has been done, each step, was
consistent with both constitutional and statuto~y provi.
s1ons.
POINT II.
THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
TO FIX THE SUPERINTENDENT'S SALARY WAS SUBJECT ONLY TO APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.
~·

.

Salary of Superintendent no longer had to be ufixed by
law."

Prior to its amendment in 1950 Section 20 of Article
VII provided :
The * * * Superintendent of Public Instruction and such other State and district officers as
may be provided for by law, shall receive for their
services monthly, a comp·ensation as fixed by law~
The amendment of 1950 deleted th~ Sup·erintendent of
Public Instruction from that section, thereby eliminat37
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ing the requirement that the compensation of that office
must be fixed by statute. Consequently it was within
the· power of the Legislature to provide in Chapter 16,
Laws of Utah 19~1, First Special Session that the Board
of· Education "shall fix the salary of the state superintendent of public instruction."
Not being a salary fixed by law, approval by the Board
of Examiners was necessary.

Section 13 of Article VII of the Utah Constitution
in part provides :

* * * the Governor, Secretary of State and
Attorney General * * * shall, also, constitute a
Board of Examiners, with power to examine all
claims against the State except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, and perform
such other duties as may be prescribed by law;
and no claim against the State, except for salaries
and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall
be passed upon by the Legislature without having
been considered and acted upon by the said Board
of Examiners. (Emphasis added)
Since the amendment eliminated the requirement
that the salary of the Superintendent be fixed by law,
and since the Legislature has specifically provided that
the salary should be fixed by the Board of Education,
that compensation no longer comes within the exception
of Section 13. Consequently, salary claims presented by
or on behalf of the Superintendent are claims against
the State which must be examined, considered and acted
upon by. the Board of Examiners.
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In discussing the authority of the Board of Examiners as set out in Section 13 this Court in State v. Edwards, 33 U. 243, 93 P. 720, said:
The powers conferred upon the board of examiners, with regard to claims against the state,
by the constitutional provision quoted above, are
general and sweeping. The power would include
all claims against the state, were it not for the
exception which excludes salaries or compensation
of officers fixed- by law. An exception of this
character may not be enlarged, or extende:d by implication. An exception which specifies the things
that are excepted from a general provision
strengthens the force of the general provisions of
the law. 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Stat. Const. Sec.
494. It is an elementary doctrine that, if there
are any provisions in a statute which in any way
conflict with a constitutional provision, the Constitution controls. * * * The attempt by the Legislature to -require the Auditor to allow a claim
which by the Constitution must first be ap·prOived
by the board of examiners can avail nothing. The
Auditor is bound by the constitutional provision.
The Legislature is so bound, and so are we. * * *
This Court has ruled that claims fo·r bounty for
killing predatory animals were claims against the state
requiring approval by the Board of Examiners. Uintah
State Bank v. Ajax, State Auditor, 77 U. 455, 297 P.
434. In that case this court said :

* * * A complete answer to this argument
is that the Constitution makes no such exception.
All ·claims are subject to action by the~ board of
examiners, except only claims for "salaries and
39
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

compensation of officers fixed by law." The claims
here are not fixed by law· in the sense that the
Legislature has made an appropriation of an
amount certain to a definite named person. * * *
May the Legislature then, in the face of our constitutional proiVision, pass ove.r the board of examiners and se~t up some local agency by which
claims may be fixed and settled without any state
officer having power to examine and approve or
disapp.rove, such claim~
If we should adopt petitioner's view, it would
follow that the Legislature might designate any
officer other than the board of examiners, as authorized in behalf of the state to settle,, fix, or
liquidate claims and agree upon the amount to be
paid thereon, and thereby exclude the board of
examiners from its duty and responsibility with
respect to claims thus liquidated pursuant to
legislative_ authority. We cannot agree to any
such construction of the constitutional language,
nor may we by construction interpolate the: word
"unliquidated" into -.the Constitution so that it
would provide that the board of examine'rs have
power to "examine all unliquidated claims against
the state" etc. The Constitution has vested in the
Board of Examiners the. power to examine and
pass on all claims except those exempted, and the
Legislature is without authority to delegate such
power to any other board or officer.
Three other states-Nevada, Idaho, and Montanahave provisions similar to .S-ection 13 creating Boards of
Examiners with power to examine all claims, with certain
exceptions, against the States. In State v. Hallock, 20
Nev. 326, 22 P. 123 the Nevada Supreme Court held that
an election expense claim certified by a board of county
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commiSSioners was subject to approval and audit by
the Board of Examiners. The Court upheld action taken
by the Board of Examiners adjusting the claim and reducing it from $1,032.15 to $775. The Nevada Court referred to the "manifest purpose of the constitution to
protect the treasury by requiring the Board of Examiners to adjust all claims" and added that it was "not
within the power of the legislature to confer this authority elsewhere."
The Idaho Supreme Court, .in the case of Supp·iger
v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P. 2d 362, made the· following
statement with. reference to the powe:r of the Idaho Board
of Examiners under a constitutional provision identical
to the provision in the Utah Constitution:
The board of examine-rs has sole· discretionary pQ>wer to deeide how and in what m·anner
it will pass upon and allow or reject claims against the state.* * *
The framers of the Constitution, by express
direction, placed full and complete power and confidence in the state board of examiners to eocerrcise
its discretion in the ultimate ap·pro;val or disapproval of claims against.the state (State v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775, 69 P. 2d 788) ; * * *
In the case of s.tate v. Robison, 59 Idaho 485, 83 P.
2d 983, the Idaho Supreme Court referre~d to the. Board
of Examiners as the "final arbiters of expenditures."
Other Utah, Idaho and Montana cases discussing the
powers of the respective Boards of Examiners are:
Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm. 95 U. 2'42, 70 P.
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2d 857; Winte~rs v. ·Ramsey, 4 Idaho 303, 39 P. 193; EppeTson v. How,ell, 28 Idaho 338, 154 P. 621; Kroutinger
v. Board of Examiners, 8 Idaho 463, 69 P. 279; Pyke v.
Steuenberg, 5 Idaho 614, 51 P. 614; State v. Parsons, 57
Idaho 775, 69 P. 2d 788; Bragaw v. Gooding, 14 Idaho
288, 94 P. 438; Gem Ir~. Dist. v. Gallet, 43 Idaho 519,
253 P. 128; Curtis v. Moore:, 38 Idaho 193, 221 P. 133;
and State v. Ericks.en, 75 Mont. 429, 244 P. 287.
In the 1896 session of the Utah Legislature Section
13 of Article VII of the Constitution was supplemented
by statutory provisions dividing claims against the State
into thre,e cate:gories for examination and consideration
by the Board of ·Examiners. Chapter XXXV, Laws of
Utah 1896. Those provisions are now found in Title 26,
UCA 1943. The three categories into which claims were
divided are: (1) those for which an appropriation has
been made; ( 2) those for which (a) no appropriation has
been made but se~ttlement of the claims has been provided for _by l~w, or (b) an appropriation has been made
but has been exhausted; and (3) claims "the settlement of
which is not otherwise provided for by law."

· S·al~ry claims by or on behalf of Superintendent
Bateman cle·arly come within the class for which an appropriation ha~ be-en made. As to such claims Sections
26-0-7 and 26-0-8 provide :
Any pe-rsons having a claim against the state
for which an appropriation has been made may
present the same to the. board in the form of an
account or petition, and the secretary of the board
must date, number and file such claim, and the
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board must allow or reject the same in the order
of its presentation. The board may, for cause,
postpone action upon a claim for not exceeding
one month. (26-0-7)
If the board approves such claim, the members thereof must indorse thereon, ove.r their
signatures, approved for the sum of___________________ _
dollars," and transinit the same to the state
auditor; and the auditor must draw his warrant
for the ainount so approved in favor of the claimant or his assigns in the order in which the same
was approved; provided, that where a group· of
claims is presented from any one department or
institution and the board approves the same, such
group of claims may be transmitted to the state
auditor with one certificate of the board showing
the claim or cl~s designated by number, the1rein approved, the amount for which ap·proved, the
payee and the appropriation or fund out of which
payable. Any member voting against the approval of a claim may specify his objection to its
allowance in whole or in part by notation on the
certificate over his signature. (26-0-8)
4'

The exhibits attached to the complaint show that
the procedure stipulated by the above sections was followed, and that a majority of the Board of· Examinersapproved the salary claims.
The salary claims having been ap·p·roved by the Bo~ard
of Examiners the Commission of Finance could not r-efuse to issue warrants if funds were available.
As previously noted, Plaintiffs have not been advised as to the grounds or reasons why the Commission
of Finance refused, and still refuse, to prepare·, draw
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and issue warrants in payment of the salary of the Superintendent. It appears, however, that the Commission
of· F'inance placed reliance upon the language of Section
82C-2-13, UCA 1943, which prorvides:
The commission of finance shall prescribe and
fix a schedule of salaries for the officers, clerks,
stenographers and employees of state offices, departments, boards and commissions, except where
such salaries are fixed by statute or by appropriation; and such schedule of salaries shall have. the
force of law in all state offices, departments,
boards and commissions, and shall in no case be
ex~eeded without the express approval . of the
commission of finance.
Sections 82C-2-14 and

82C-2~21

also provide:

The commission of financH shall examine all
requests for personnel and shall approve or disapprove the same and no new position shall be
created and no vacancy shall be: filled until the
commission has certified to the department requesting the· creation of a new position or the
filling of the vacancy that the position is necessary to carry on the work of such department in
an efficient and business-like manner and that the
necessary funds therefor are available to the
department. The commission shall investigate ·
the need for every exiS'ting position in every
department and shall re:port its findings to the
board of examiners with its recommendations for
the most effective means of discontinuing unnecessary positions. (82C-2-14)
The commission of finance shall exercise accounting control over all state departments and
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agencies and prescribe the manner and method
of certifying that flmds are available and adequate to n1eet all contracts and obligations. The
con1mission shall examine and approve, or disapprove, all requisitions and proposed expenditures for the several departments, except salarie~s
or compensation of officers fixed by law, and no
requisition of any of the departments shall be
allowed nor shall any obligation be created with-out the approval and certification of the commission. The commission of finance shall pre-audit
all claims against the state. The commission of
finance shall, with the approval of the state auditor as to the adequacy of such documents ill
facilitating the post-audit of public accounts, prescribe all forms of requisitions, receipts, vouchers,
bills or claims to be used by the several dep·artments and the forms, procedures, and records to
be maintained by all departmental, institutional
or agency store rooms and exercise inventory control over such store rooms. (82C-2-21)
When the foregoing provisions were first enacted
question was raised as to their constitutionality.- Attached to the Complaint in this case as Exhibits "G",
"H", "I" and "J" are copies of opinions issued by the
office of Attorney General under dates of August 6,
1941, and August 20, 1941, a letter from the Chainnan of
the Commission of Finance to the Attorney General
dated August 11, 1941, and excerpts from minutes of_
the meeting of the Board of Examiners held November
19, 1941, in which the question of constitutionality of
provisions in the Finance Commission Act of 1941 is
discussed. These documents demonstrate that in 1941
the Attorney General, the Commission of Finance and
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the Board of Examiners recognized that some of the
provisions in the sections quoted above impinged upon
the constitutional powers and duties of the Board of
Examiners. The e,xcerpts from minutes of the mee-ting
of the Board of Examiners held November 19, 1941, very
clearly show that that Board, in an attempt to remove
the difficulty, appointed the Commission of Finance as
it~ .agent to assist the Board of Examiners in the processing. of claims. But in making the Commission of
Finance its agent to assist the Board in the processing
, 9f such claims the Board of Examiners :rointed out that
it could not "evade or pass to the Commission of Finance
its constitutional responsibility." Consequently, the
Board of Examine_rs specifically, and expressly, reserved
·"supervisory C()ntrol to the end that if, at any time, the
procedure should prove inadequate to properly guard
the public eJCpenditures, the Board may have an opportunity to correct any irregularity found to exist," and
the Board added: "This, of course, means that any time
the Board sees fit to question any commitment at any
stage of the procedure, it may do so."
We think the opinions and the le~tter from the Board
of Examiners to the Commission of Finance. dated November 19, 1941, clearly indicate that the Board was
attempting only to constitute the Commission its agent
to assist in the processing procedure conn~cted with
claims against the state. The Board did not, and it could
not, delegate to the Commission of Finance power to
approve or disapprove claims. That is the constitutional
power of the Board of Examiners and it could not legally
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delegate that power to the Commission of Finance, nor
could the Legislature empower the Commission to p·erform such authority. To the extent that Sections 82C2-13, 14 and 21 attempt to give the Commission of Finance power and authority to examine and approve· or
disapprove clai1ns against the State, we submit that those
provisions are unconstitutional because they conflict with
the provisions of Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The provision in Section 82C-2-21 that the Commission "shall examine and appro~e, or disappro~e, all
requisitions and proposed expenditure's of the several
departments, except salaries or compensation of officeTs
fixed by law, and no requisition of any of the departments shall be allowed nor shall any obligation be created
without the approval and certification of the commission"
we submit is directly in conflict with the constitutional
power of the Board of Examiners to "examine all claims
against the State except salaries or compensation of
officers fixed by law." Likewise, we submit that the· provision in Section 82C-2~13 that the Commis.sion "shall
prescribe and fix a schedule of salaries * * * except where
such salaries are fixed by statute or by appropriation"
and that such schedules of salaries "shall in no case be
exceeded without the express appro;val of the commission
of finance" does not and could not take away from the
Board of Examiners its exclusive constitutional power
to examine and approve or disapprove salary claims
against the state, other than those fixed by law.
It will also be remembered that Chapter 16, as
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passed "by the Special Session in 1951, specifically authorized the ·Board of Education to ''fix" the salary of the
· Superintendent. It is our contention that this statutory
power given to the Board of Education was subject only
to·the constitutional power of the.Board of Examiners.
If there is a conflict between the provisions of Section 82C-2-13 and S·ection 75-7-2, as amended by the
Special Session, as to the power of "fixing" the salary
of the Superintendent, then the provisions of Section
75-7-2 must prevaiL That is the late·rstatute, and under
well established principles would re~p,eal by implication
any part of 82C-2-13 in conflict therewith.. Chapte·r 16,
Laws of· Utah 1951, First Special Session, contains this
proVision:
All existing statutes of the state of Utah
which are inconsistent or in conflict with this act,
are to the extent of such inconsistency or conflict, declared null and void insofar as they relate
to the provisions of this act..
Likewise, to the extent that there is conflict between
the provisions in Chapter 16 that the Board of Education
"shall fix the salary of the state superintendent of public
instruction'' and the pro;visions in Section 87-1-1, as
amend~d _by Chapter 124, Laws of Utah 1945, the 1951
act will prevail. Section 87-1-1, as amended, provides :
The annual salaries of the following state
officers are fixed as follows : * * * superintendent
of public instruction, $6,000.
·In Commonwealth v. Rose, Commissioner, 160 Va.
177, 168 S.E. 356, the Virginia court had before it a
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situation not unlike the one before us. There, an act
had been passed fixing the compensation of commissioners of revenue at not to exceed $2500 per year for local
services to cities. Later the Legislature enacted a neiW
charter for the city of Riclunond providing that the city
council "may fix the compensation of the commis·sione:r
of the revenue for services rendered the city." In hoJding that the later provision repealed by implication the
former limitation, the Court said :
It is not easy to understand how this statement could be misunderstood. To fix compensation is to name it * * *
It is said that repeal by implication is not
favored and that statutes apparently in conflict
are to be reconciled when possible. These are
propositions at this late date not questioned; but,
where the implicatton is inevitable·, it has all the
force of an express declaration. * * *
Unless words are smoke screens, a statement
to the effeet that a city shall not pay its commissioner of revenue more than $2,500, followed by a
later enactment to the effect that it may fix his
compensation, leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the first limitation is sup-erseded. * * * The
state, by statute, has given to the city in its charter, in words as clear as our language offers,
power to say what it will pay to its commissioners
of revenue. That declaration cannot be overridden so long as law requires us to give a plain
meaning to plain words.
In the case of Abrams et al., v. La Guardia, Mayor,
et al., 174 Misc. 421, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 891 (1940), the court
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held that language authorizing a Board of .Estimate "to
fi:x: the salaries and compensation of the justices. of the
municipal court" did not confer a limited power ~ut
implied ''a·p.Je.i1ary right to act :free from any judicial
or administrative interference." In construing· a constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to "fix"
salares of county superintendents of schools the court
in Woodcock v. Dick (Cal. 1950), 222 P. 2d 667, said:
The word. "fix" means to determine, to assign
precisely, to make definite and settled. Webster's
New Internat. Diet., 2d ed. To fix compensation
is to prescribe a rul~· or rate by which it is to be
determine:d. Flagg v. Columbia· County, 51 Or.
172, 94 P. 184, 186; Anderson's Law Diet. It has
been held that the power to fix compensation
include·s the. power to adjust or regulate- and
implies a plenary right to act by lowering o·r
raising salaries. * * *. (citing cases)
We submit that the power of the State Board of
Education to fix the salary of the Superintendent was
subject only to the constitutional power of the Board of
Examiners to examine claims against the State. To the
·e~tent that any statutes passed prior to Chapter 16 give
power or authority to the Commission of Finance to fix,
app:tove or disapp-rove the salary of the Superintendent,
such provisions were repealed by implication when Chapter 16 became~ law.
Under the circumstances, the only function of the
Commission of Finance was to determine whether funds
were available to pay the salary claims and then to
process them, and prepare and issue the warrants.
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CONCLUSION
We submit that the State Board of Education was
authorized to appoint Dr. Bateman Superintendent of
Public Instruction and to fix the salary at $10.000.
After salary claims 'vere processed and approved by the
Board of Exruniners the Commission of Finance had
no legal right to refuse to issue warrants cove·ring those
claims. A Peremptory 'Vrit should issue comp·ellin.g
defendants to issue warrants covering salary claims
properly submitted by and on behalf of Dr. Bateman
and approved by the Board of Examiners.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. YERNON,
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
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